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A Post-Accident Analysis of Civil
Remotely-Piloted Aircraft System
Accidents and Incidents
Graham Wild1, Kellie Gavin1, John Murray1,2, Jose Silva1, Glenn Baxter1

Abstract: A sample of 152 accidents and incidents
involving Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, more commonly
referred to as “drones”, have been analysed. The data was
collected from a 10-year period, 2006 to 2015, conveniently
sourced from a limited population owing to the scarcity of
reports. Results indicate that safety occurrences involving
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) have a significantly
different distribution of contributing factors when sorted into
distinct categories. This provides a thorough and up-to-date
characterization of the safety deficiencies specific to RPAS. In
turn, this contributes to the development of adequate safety
management systems applicable to the RPAS sector. The
majority of RPAS occurrences involved system component
failures which were the result of equipment problems.
Therefore, airworthiness instead of pilot licensing needs to be
considered first when regulating the Remotely Piloted Aircraft
System industry. “Human factors” and “loss of control in-flight”
were found to be the second most common “contributing
factor” and “occurrence category”, respectively; Remotely
Piloted Aircraft pilot licensing will help reduce the probability
of these secondary occurrences. The most significant
conclusion is that reporting systems must be implemented
to address RPAS accidents and incidents specifically, such
that more useful data is available, and further analysis is
possible facilitating an improved understanding and greater
awareness.
Keywords: RPAS, UAS, UAV, Accidents and incidents,
Aviation safety.

Introduction
There is a growing interest in aircraft that are controlled
from a remote location without a pilot located in the aircraft
itself. Referred to by many terms (“drones”, UAV, UAS, etc.)
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO 2015)
has recently adopted “Remotely Piloted Aircraft System”
(RPAS) to identify these aircraft. The absence of a flight crew
on-board the aircraft creates unique challenges in terms of
the safety risks associated with the operation of RPAS. That is,
the dimensions and applicability of the well-known Software,
Hardware, Environment, Liveware, and Liveware (SHELL)
model adopted by ICAO Circular 216-AN31 (ICAO 1989)
will be significantly different from those associated with the
operation of conventionally-piloted aircraft. In particular,
the interrelationships between the elements constituting the
framework of the SHELL model will be significantly different.
These unmanned aircraft, commonly referred to as “drones”
in the defence sector, usually conjure up thoughts of Predator
UCAVs firing Hellfire missiles in combat operations (Callam
2015). In the civil sector, the presence of RPAS is still a relatively
new phenomenon (ICAO 2011; Skrzypietz 2012). From the
1990s, civil operation of RPAS was mostly seen in the Japanese
agriculture industry (MarketLine 2014; Odido and Madara
2013). The ever-evolving nature of the aviation industry has
supported a vast deviation of RPAS into civilian aviation.
These areas include policing activities, wildlife and fisheries
protection, environmental monitoring, surveillance, as well as
search and rescue (Gupta et al. 2013). The aviation industry
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recognises the economic benefits of remotely piloted aircraft and
acknowledges the many opportunities provided by their use in
“dull, dirty, dangerous and demanding” tasks, that may otherwise
impose high risk to a piloted aircraft (CASA date unknown, b).
The examination of past accident and incident cases
can assist in the continuous improvement of safety, such
that potential hazards, unsafe acts, and latent conditions are
identified before they have disastrous effects (ICAO 2013).
This vital data can lead to more informed decision-making by
regulatory bodies around corrective actions moving forward
and the allocation of resources (ICAO 2007). It also allows
for the communication and dissemination of valuable safety
information, which is key in fostering a positive safety culture in
the industry (ICAO 2013). The definition of accident and incident
adopted by ICAO will be used in the context of this paper. For
simplicity, throughout this paper, the term “occurrence” will
be used when referring to both accident and incident events.
It is hoped that this research will assist in the reduction of
accidents and incidents in the civil RPAS sector by analysing past
occurrences and identifying common contributing factors. To
this end, a sample of 152 civil RPAS accidents and incidents was
analysed. The data set spanned a 10-year period, from 2006 to
2015. The data was sourced from multiple online databases and
was then classified by type of occurrence, occurrence category,
contributing factors, phase of flight, and time of flight. The
primary research question posed in this paper is “what are
the common factors in RPAS accidents and incidents in civil
aviation between 2006 and 2015?”.

Literature Review
Accidents and incidents are an unfortunate element of all
sectors of the aviation industry, with the RPAS sector being
no exception (Clothier and Walker 2015; ICAO 2013). The
complexity of the systems and the many external influences
on them mean that aiming for zero accidents is unrealistic.
A more achievable approach to safety for operators and
regulators is to focus on managing the potential hazards
and risks associated with their operation to a level as low
as reasonably possible (Clothier and Walker 2015; Xunguo
et al. 2014). As supported by ICAO (2013) in their Safety
Management Manual, it is clear that the collection of accident
and incident data is a key step in the identification of potential
hazards and risk areas.

The necessity of this research is exacerbated by the intense
growth of the RPAS sector in recent years. Valavanis and
Vachtsevanos (2015) attribute this growth to the steps taken by
regulatory bodies such as the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and the European Commission to outline Civilian RPAS
roadmaps. With the use of RPAS becoming more diverse and
its development fast-tracked with lowering costs, there is a real
need to remain proactive, ensuring the overwhelming benefits
are not overshadowed by the potential risk to safety (AIA date
unknown; Harrison 2013; Valavanis and Vachtsevanos 2015).
Safety Trend
With air travel commonly referred to as the safest form
of travel, statistics published by Allianz (2014) show that the
aviation sector’s safety level has consistently increased over
the decades with accident rates in recent years at their lowest.
This positive safety trend has been attributed to advancements
of technology and the process of continuous improvement
adopted by the industry, which includes the study of accident
and incident causation (Allianz 2014).
However, Allianz (2014) also highlights the very real risk
that technological advancements such as RPAS may have on
this safety position, with a report undertaken by the Joint
Authorities for Rule-Making on Unmanned Systems (JARUS
WG-6 2014) supporting this. RPAS operations are set to
increase substantially in the future and focus on operations in
non-segregated airspace, a requirement for the sector’s future
viability (AIA date unknown; European Commission 2014).
As such, it is important that accidents and incidents involving
these systems are mitigated before they eventuate — a sentiment
supported by Clarke and Bennett Moses (2014).
Whilst it is not the aim of this research to determine if
unmanned aircraft are, or are not, safer than manned aircraft;
it is important to acknowledge the literature on both sides.
AIA (date unknown) and Skrzypietz (2012) take the point-ofview that RPAS may in fact offer increased operational safety
over conventional manned aircraft through “sense and avoid”
technologies. Those studies suggest that the risks are lower
given the removal of the human element in the cockpit. In
contrast, Clarke and Bennett Moses (2014) suggest that the
remoteness of the pilot in these systems may lead to a greater
lack of situational awareness, and hence an increased safety
risk. What this literature highlights is that more research needs
to be undertaken on the impact of RPAS operations in civil
environments.
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The Importance of Identifying Common
Factors
There has been extensive research highlighting the potential
of the emerging RPAS sector and the challenges it brings in the
safety arena. The industry and regulatory bodies are working
to address these many challenges (AIA date unknown). As
previously discussed, the exploration of common factors
in previous occurrences is a key input for helping to identify
and influence relevant regulatory decisions and processes
(ICAO 2013).
Previous research undertaken within different aviation
environments has previously been conducted and highlights the
effectiveness of this reactive method. Australia’s Bureau of Air
Safety Investigation (BASI 1996) completed a study into fatal
accidents in the general aviation (GA) sector. Issues surrounding
human factors were found to contribute to approximately
70 – 80% of accidents in this sector. A later report by Australia’s
Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA date unknown, a) into
common factors in Australian GA accidents was able to reveal
information including that:
•
The high number of fatal accidents in the private
flight category.
•
Key factors in accidents of inadequate flight planning
and aircraft handling.
•
Of the flight planning management category, 17%
could be attributed to unnecessary low-level flying.
The CASA’s research was undertaken with a similar view to
this present study, in that it will enable further detailed analysis
to take place in the future (CASA date unknown, a). In 2010,
further analysis took place addressing key CASA findings of
GA accidents in the private flight category. Undertaken by the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB 2010), the report
analysed this type of occurrence in more detail and was able
to provide key safety information.
Research completed by Clothier and Walker (2015) used
sample data from Tvaryanas et al. (2006). This study of military
RPAS accidents and common failure categories identified
common human factor elements as a cause for 60.2% of the
221 cases studied. This information allows risks to be identified
with the aim of mitigating them before they eventuate (Clothier
and Walker 2015; ICAO 2007, 2013). This study was significant
as it represented the first post-accident analysis of a relatively
large sample of RPAS accidents for the defence sector.
The relevance of post-accident, explorative research can
also be witnessed in a recent report by Boyd (2015), who

159

investigated the “causes and risk factors for fatal accidents in
non-commercial twin engine piston general aviation aircraft”.
Having similar motives to the research herein, Boyd’s report
highlights the valuable information that can be attained through
a post-accident review, and identified a potential deficiency in
key training areas. Armed with this vital knowledge, regulatory
bodies were able to make informed decisions, in Boyd’s case
about the multi-engine rating training syllabus. Safety bulletins
were then disseminated and flight schools could review their
training methods. Without post-accident analysis, vital statistics
would not have been discovered, including that 70 – 80%
of accidents are related to human elements (Clothier and
Walker 2015), or that 53% of GA accidents during 1999 – 2000
correspond to private flight (CASA date unknown, a). Hence
valuable safety information and regulations may not have been
created or amended.
Accident and Incident Reporting
The rules and regulations governing aviation activities are “as
fundamental and rudimentary to the aviation industry as civil
order is to modern society” (Bartsch 2015). Australia became
one of the first countries to regulate the operation of RPAS in
civil airspace with the introduction in 2002 of rules specifically
for unmanned aerial activities, (CASA date unknown). Since
then, significant progress has been made in the promulgation
of rules for RPAS operations with the FAA in the USA putting
into place policies in 2007 allowing the integration of RPAS into
non-segregated airspace (FAA 2013). Work has continued to
progress in Europe to assure harmonisation of regulations across
the continents (European RPAS Steering Group 2013). ICAO
is in the process of developing standards and recommended
practices (SARPs) for RPAS operations and the RPAS Manual
(RPASM) was published in 2015 to provide guidance for
contracting States on RPAS integration into non-segregated
airspace (Bartsch 2015).
Whilst all rules and regulations are important to guide this
sector, the focus for this research is only on the importance of
regulations pertaining to the reporting of RPAS accidents and
incidents. Issues surrounding the existence of RPAS accident
and incident reporting systems have been discussed recently
by both Enomoto et al. (2013) and Clothier and Walker (2015).
Both studies identified issues with the ability to collect valid
accident and incident information due to inaccessibility,
inconsistencies, and gaps in data, a limitation that is also noted in
this current paper.
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The opposite is apparent in the military RPAS sector where
data is more publically accessible (Clothier and Walker 2015),
therefore, studies of military occurrences have been more
prominent. Enomoto et al. (2013) identified in their study a
number of publicly available sources that contained or had the
potential to capture civil RPAS occurrences, however these
existed only in the US, Australia, United Kingdom, and Canada.
Voluntary reporting systems, such as the United States FAA
Near Mid-Air Collision System (NMACS), exist as a means to
encourage aviators to submit reports. Whilst the importance of
these reporting systems are recognised, it has been suggested
that not having controls or regulations for RPAS occurrence
reporting facilitates the distortion of data (Goglia 2014).
This then suggests that the subjectiveness of suspected RPAS
occurrences can in fact degrade the ability to draw on these
databases as a source of truth in implementing safety actions/
recommendations. Instead of playing a role in the output of
safety recommendations and regulations as is intended with
these regulatory accident and incident databases, Goglia (2014)
argues that they just allow for the collection of unsubstantiated
claims of a “growing problem with small drones”.
Regardless of whether the systems available are mandatory
or voluntary, a key issue is the lack of consistency across ICAO
member states and within the respective databases. Having
appropriate regulations in place to address the type and quantity
of data to be collected will no doubt assist as a first step. The
approach taken by ICAO, the International Air Transport
Association (IATA), and other organisations to harmonise
their safety data reporting would also help in the comparison
of safety data regarding accidents and incidents in RPAS.

Methodology
Design
This study followed a mixed-method approach, specifically
an exploratory design, in which the first phase saw the
implementation of content analysis, a qualitative method.
This was utilised in order to systematically select and examine
information within relevant accident and incident case studies
and then to identify common trends and themes (Leedy and
Ormrod 2013). The cases were selected through convenience
sampling. That is, no random sub-sampling was conducted
and all of the cases found were included. Following this, the
categorised data was then quantified and analysed to uncover
common causal factors to determine if any statistical significance

existed. That is, the second phase (the quantitative phase) of
the mixed method was a causal-comparative study.
Data Collection
The 152 cases analysed and discussed in this paper were
collected from a number of publically available accident
investigation databases, safety reporting systems, and through a
general website search. These included, but were not limited to:
•
FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
System.
•
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System.
•
Civil Aviation Authority.
The data collected focussed specifically on RPAS accidents
and incidents whilst under civil operation only, between the
years 2006 to 2015.
A number of reports were found (35 in total) through
the data collection stage that identified airspace incursions
or separation incidents involving RPAS. These reports were
made to accident investigation bodies by numerous sources
such as commercial airline pilots and air traffic controllers.
Unfortunately these cases did not have conclusive evidence of
RPAS involvement and the RPAS operator was not able to be
identified. For this reason they have been excluded from the
scope of this study. Instead, this research has only focused on
the common “occurrence categories” and “contributing factors”
that lead to RPAS incidents or accidents so that the frequency
and type of these occurrences may be better understood and
mitigated in future.
Data Classification
Specific fields (variables) were identified and the cases were
entered against these. These fields were selected and this method
of collection was chosen after a review of previous research
papers that performed similar activities in other aviation sectors.
In particular, the annual Statistical Summary of Commercial
Jet Airplane Accidents publication completed by Boeing was
pivotal to inform the post accident analysis methodology. The
ATSB Aviation Accident or Incident Notication form also
provided relevant classifications for collection. The importance
and relevance of selecting key categories in accident analysis
was identifed by Boeing (2013), which suggested that the
approach provides greater insight for the risk management
and continuous improvement processes. As such, the ICAO
Aviation Occurrence Categories were used to code the cases.
A slight revision to these categories was made in this paper in
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order to simplify the collection. The System Component Failure/
Malfunction (SCF) categories under ICAO’s standards are
separated into 2 subcategories — SCF non powerplant events
and SCF powerplant events. This study has simply combined
the 2 and considers all SCF events together. The Occurrence
Categories (OC) used in the coding were:
•
System Component Failure (SCF).
•
Loss of Control – Inflight (LOC-I).
•
Navigation Error (NAV).
•
Abnormal Runway Contact (ARC).
•
Collision with obstacle(s) during takeoff and landing
(CTOL).
•
Air Traffic Management/Communication Navigation
Survellence (ATM).
•
Midair/Near Midair Collision (MAC).
•
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).
•
Loss of Control – Ground (LOC-G).
•
Turbulence (TURB).
•
Unknown (UNK).
The second field identified was the Factors Contributing to
Occurrence. The Contributing Factors (CF) were coded into
specific elements in order to ensure a consistent approach.
These elements were:
•
Equipment Problems (EP).
•
Human Factors (HF).
•
Organisational Issues (OI).
•
Environmental Issues (EI).
•
Unknown (UNK).
These elements were adopted through review of other similar
studies such as Pagán et al. (2006) and Boyd (2015). Additionally,
research by Johnson and Holloway (2007) was drawn on to
classify the high level contributing factors.
The phase of flight was also an important field identified.
The Phases of Flight (PoF) used to code the cases investigated
in this study included:
•
Takeoff and climb out.
•
Cruise or en-route.
•
Descent, approach, and landing.
•
Unknown.
It should be noted that other typical phases of flight exist, which
have been omitted from this study. This is justifiable as there
were no RPAS occurrences in these categories.
The final 2 fields coded were time of occurrence (ToO) and
the occurrence type (OT). The ToO was coded as either night
or day. The OT was coded as either an accident or an incident.
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Analysis
Once all 152 cases had been collated and classified, common
trends were identified and frequencies of occurrences were
noted (Leedy and Ormrod 2013). The first stage of this was
to visually inspect data in charts to assist in the uncovering
of significant information such as the primary CF and OC
as well as the frequency of these cases. In order to determine
statistical significance of this categorical data, Pearson’s χ2 test
of independence was performed (Berman and Wang 2011). The
test was employed when comparing data such as OC by type of
occurrence and importantly when looking at the significance
of OCs and contributing factors under different conditions
such as PoF and ToO conditions (Boyd 2015; Pagán et al. 2006).
The quantitative data analysis involved Pearson’s χ2 tests for
independence. The statistical hypotheses are given as:

H0: pi,n = pj,n
HA: pi,n ≠ pj,n

(1)

where: subscripts i and j represent the 2 fields being compared
(in this paper these are 2 of OC, CF, PoF, ToO, or OT); p is in
reference to the proportions of the n-th category (there are 4 for
OC, 4 for CF, 3 for PoF, 2 for ToO, and 2 for OT). H0 is the null
hypothesis and can therefore be expressed as: “the proportions of
field i cases are equal for the proportions for field j cases”. HA is the
alternative hypothesis, and, in contrast to this, “the proportions
are not equal”. The χ2 is given by Berman and Wang (2011):
(2)

where: there are n classifications for field i, and m classifications
for field j.
The number of degrees of freedom, df, is given as (n – 1)
(m – 1) for each test. The critical value was then determined
from the degrees of freedom using the χ2 table, with a 95%
confidence level. Finally, if χ2 was less than the critical value
H0 was accepted, otherwise, H0 was rejected.

Results
Classifications
In total, 152 cases involving RPAS accidents or incidents
were collected that occurred in the 10-year period from 2006 to
2015. The breakdown of cases coded in terms of OC is shown
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Comparison
Following the initial quantification of the coded data,
the various fields were compared and contrasted in terms
of their percentage distribution. Figure 2a shows the OCs
percentage proportions for each of the other fields. Figure 1a
shows that a large number of categories contain a relatively
small number of cases; as such, these categories were grouped
into an “other” category. This would not influence the nature
of the proportional distribution. Visually the proportions
for the OCs appear to be different for every field. Of note is
that the majority of EPs correspond to SCFs. Next, the OIs
are split between NAV and “other”. Finally, for EIs there are a
large number of “other” cases which includes environmental
related occurrences such as TURB, WILD etc. For PoF relative
to OT shows a large number of “other” for landing, which
includes ARC, CTOL, etc. For ToO, there is a large number of
NAV cases at night. For the OT, the inference is that a larger
proportion of incidents involve SCFs, and a larger proportion
of accidents involve NAV.
Next the CF was compared and contrasted to the remaining
fields. For PoF, it can be seen in Fig. 2b that HFs are more

common for landing, while EPs are more common for takeoff,
and cruise cases show the most OIs, with no EIs.

Count
Count
(d)

TUR

UNK
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LOC-G

ATM
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(a)

60
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30
20
10
0

120

Cruise

Take off Landing

UNK

Time of Occurence

100

Count

in Fig. 1a. Across the cases, the most common OCs were found
to be SCFs at 63% and LOC-I at 14%.
Figure 1b shows the breakdown of cases coded by the CF.
EPs have the highest percentage, at 41%, while HFs are the
second most common at 15%. These numbers, however, are
skewed by the large number of UNK events (35%). Hence, if
these are excluded there are 64% EPs, and 23% HFs.
The breakdown of cases coded by PoF is shown in Fig. 1c.
Once again a relatively large number of reported cases did
not include information about which PoF the occurrence
happened. Excluding these UNK cases it is noted that 45% of
cases occurred in cruise, 30% of cases occurred at takeoff, and
25% of cases occurred during landing.
Figure 1d shows the breakdown of cases coded by ToO.
Note the majority of case reports did not indicate the time
when the occurrence happened. The percentage of cases that
occurred during the day was 70% while the percentage of cases
that occurred at night was 30%, excluding the UNK cases.
Finally, the OT was quantified. As every occurrence
could be classified as either an incident or an accident there
were no UNK cases. The breakdown is shown in Fig. 1e.
The incidents account for 74% of all cases while accidents
account for 26%.
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120
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Day
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Count

162
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Figure 1. Pareto plot showing number of cases (2006-2015).
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Figure 2c compares and contrasts PoF to ToO and OT.
These show relatively similar proportions. This is important
to consider as the data suggests that night time occurrences
happen in cruise and not during takeoff or landing as one
may hypothesise. When looking at the OT cases that are
accidents they occur more frequently during takeoff and
landing.
Finally, the comparison between ToO and OT is shown in
Fig. 2d. The proportions are identical. It is worth noting that
there is no specific reason why this would not be the case, and
helps to suggest the random nature of the sample. It might be
conceivable, however, to hypothesise that accidents at night
would be more common.
(a)

OCs versus CF, PoF, ToO, and OT
SCF
LOC-I
NAV
Other

EI
OI
HF
EP
Landing
Taking off
Cruise
Night
Day
Accident
Incident
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40%
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Figure 2. Percentage breakdown of cases, across the 10year period (2006 – 2015). Note: UNK cases have been
excluded.
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Analysis
To confirm the visual comparison from Fig. 2a to Fig. 2d,
the Pearson χ2 test for independence between each of the fields
was undertaken. In total, there are 10 ways the 5 fields can be
paired. These are all summarised in Table 1, in the top 2 rows.
The table also shows the corresponding χ2 test statistics, the
degrees of freedom, the critical value, the p-value (the probability
for the given test statistic with the stated degrees of freedom),
and the conclusion. OCs and CF are discussed in detail below.
At this point it is noted that the proportions of PoF between
ToO is not statistically significant (χ2 = 1.59, a = 0.05, df = 2).
That is, PoF cases are not more or less likely to occur because of
the ToO. In fact, it may have been plausible to hypothesise that
night operations would result in more occurrences during
takeoff and landing, which is not supported by the findings.
Similarly, the proportions for PoF between OT is not statistically
significant (χ2 = 4.44, a = 0.05, df = 2). That is, PoF does not
result in a greater or lesser proportion of accidents relative to
incidents. There does appear to be a larger proportion of accidents
during takeoff and landing, but the limited sample size means
this conclusion is not statistically significant. Finally, of ToO and
OT showed no statistical significance (χ2 = 0.00, a = 0.05, df = 1),
as highlighted in the “Comparison” section.
Occurrence Category
A statistical significance was found between the OCs and the
CFs (χ2 = 75.7, a = 0.05, df = 9), that is, at the 95% confidence
level the null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that there
is a difference in the distribution between CFs for different OCs.
More directly, it is fair to state that CFs influence specific
OCs in different ways. It can then be concluded that:
•
EPs contribute the most to SCF.
•
HFs are more significant for LOC-I cases.
•
OIs are associated with “other” and NAV cases.
•
EIs are more common for “other” (TURB and WILD
etc.) cases.
A statistical significance was also found between the OC
and PoF (χ2 = 15.1, a = 0.05, df = 6). So, at the 95% confidence
level, the null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that
there is a difference in the distribution between PoF for different
OCs. That is, OC occur at different rates in the different PoF.
Based on the proportions it can be concluded that:
•
Cruise has a larger proportion of SCF.
•
Takeoff has the largest portion of LOC-I cases.
•
Landing has the most “other” (ARC, CTOL etc.) cases.
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Table 1. Pearson’s χ2 test for independence comparing pairs of fields.
Field 1

Category

Factor

Field 2

Factor

PoF

Time

Type

PoF

Time

2

c

75.7

15.1

10.8

18.8

19.02

α

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

df

9

6

3

3

Critical

16.92

12.59

7.81

p-value

1E-12

0.020

Conclusion

Reject

Reject

PoF

Time

Type

Time

Type

6.98

5.5

1.59

4.44

0

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.05

6

3

3

2

2

1

7.81

12.59

7.81

7.81

5.99

5.99

3.84

0.013

0.0003

0.004

0.07

0.139

0.45

0.11

1

Reject

Reject

Reject

Accept

Accept

Accept

Accept

Accept

A statistical significance was also found between the
OCs and ToO (χ2 = 10.8, a = 0.05, df = 3). So, at the 95%
confidence level, the null hypothesis is rejected and it
is concluded that there is a difference in the distribution of
the ToO between the types of OC. That is, OCs have different
rates during the day and night. Based on the proportions it
can be concluded that:
•
Day-time cases have a larger proportion of SCF.
•
Night-time cases have a significantly larger proportion
of NAV cases.
A statistical significance was also found between the OC and
OT (χ2 = 18.8, a = 0.05, df = 3). So, at the 95% confidence level,
the null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that there is
a difference in the distribution between OT for the different
OCs. That is, the end result (an incident or an accident) varies
based on the OCs. It can then be concluded that:
•
A larger proportion of incidents are associated with
SCFs.
•
A relatively larger proportion of accidents result from
LOC-I.
Contributing Factor
A statistical significance was found between the CF and PoF
(χ2 = 19.0, a = 0.05, df = 6). So, at the 95% confidence level,
the null hypothesis is rejected and it is concluded that there is
a difference in the distribution between PoF across the CFs.
That is, CFs are involved at different rates in the different PoF.
Based on the proportions it can be concluded that:
•
Cruise has the largest proportion of OIs and no recorded
EIs.
•
Takeoff has the largest proportion of EPs and the
smallest portion HFs.
•
Landing has the largest proportion of HFs contributions
and no OIs.

Type

A breakdown of CFs across OT showed no statistical
significance (χ2 = 5.50, a = 0.05, df = 3). Hence, it can be
assumed that the CFs are similar for cases if they are coded
as accidents or incidents. Similarly the division of CFs by
ToO showed no statistical significance (χ2 = 6.98, a = 0.05,
df = 3). However, this results in a p-value of 0.07, which is
more than 90% significant. The most likely type of error
associated with a χ2 test is a Type II Error (accepting H0
when it should be rejected). As such, the division of CFs by
ToO should be considered borderline. Therefore it is worth
noting the potential that OIs contribute to the majority of
night-time cases.

Discussion
Findings
The data collected revealed that 61% of all occurrences
were attributed to SCFs, with a significant gap between the
next closest OC factor, LOC-I. A report by the ATSB on the
accidents and incidents in an Australian aviation context over
the period 2003 to 2012 showed markedly different results
than those found in the civil RPAS sector. The ATSB report
revealed that for the Australian GA and Air Transport sectors,
NAV and wildlife (WILD) occurrences dominated (ATSB
2013). Seemingly the RPAS sector most resembles that of
the Recreational Aviation (RA) sector in terms of occurrence
categories. One reason behind this similarity could be the
less restrictive certification standards required in these 2
sectors in terms of airworthiness and design (Brandon 2014;
Johnson 2010).
Whilst it is recognised that a zero occurrence rate is not
realistic and that there are no preferable OCs, the high frequency
of SCF occurrences certainly highlights an area that deserves
further detailed research. It is disconcerting to find that

J. Aerosp. Technol. Manag., São José dos Campos, Vol.9, No 2, pp.157-168, Apr.-Jun., 2017

A Post-Accident Analysis of Civil Remotely-Piloted Aircraft System Accidents and Incidents

when disregarding the UNK category, 93% of SCF cases were
contributed to by EPs. These included loss of data link, software
malfunctions and flight control issues to name a few. Examples
of these issues identified in cases collected include:
•
Case Reference No 34a “Engine mount failure resulting
in propeller damage on landing”.
•
Case Reference No 34g “Iridium C2 modem failure.
(One of 4 modems)”.
•
Case Reference No 34u “Anomalous Embedded GPS/
Inertial Navigation System (EGI) GPS degradation”.
The types of accidents and incidents that occur in RPAS
operations have been influenced by the greater reliance on and
complexity of (Gupta et al. 2013; Hobbs and Herwitz 2006):
•
Communication links.
•
Navigation hardware.
•
Software.
The same can also be said for the CFs identified in these
accidents and incidents. This study has revealed that although
HFs have been widely attributed to over 2/3 of aviation
accidents and incidents (BASI 1996; Clothier and Walker
2015; Skrzypietz 2012), the same cannot be said regarding
the civil RPAS sector. Instead, equipment failures (41%) have
appeared to be more of a primary instigator in occurrences.
This is clearly in contrast to other sectors. Interestingly,
despite clear differences between the civil and military RPAS
sectors, failure of aircraft components (66%) also had more
of a significance over that of human error (34%) within the
military as well (Williams 2004).
It appears suggestions by the AIA (date unknown) and also
Skrzypietz (2012), that the removal of the on-board pilot in
these systems should result in a reduced risk, maybe supported
by the results in this study. It is unknown whether EPs based
SCFs and LOC-I occurrences are due to design flaws or if system
maintenance is to blame, which could be HF and OI induced.
Hobbs and Herwitz (2006) suggest that the level of knowledge
and experience of RPAS maintenance personnel may not be
at the level required due to the complexity and diversity of the
systems and the infancy of the sector, potentially contributing
to the problem.
Reviewing cases in more detail revealed a statistical
significance between the PoF and CFs, with EPs more prevalent
in cruise whilst the landing phase saw HFs dominate. Further
research needs to be undertaken in order to determine the main
types of EPs experienced in these cases; however, initial review
indicates that just under a third involved “lost link” issues. The
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prevalence of these types of failures may be rationalised by types
of communication links utilised in different phases (Kaliardos
and Lyall 2015). During critical phases such as takeoff and
landing, line of sight links resulting in less latency and reduced
impact of degradation are used; whereas phases such as cruise
that require less manoeuvrability often rely on satellite based
control links which are more susceptible to degradation given
the increased latency (Kaliardos and Lyall 2015).
It was not surprising to discover that HFs played the
primary role in cases during the landing phase. Cited as
one of the most critical flight phases, both unmanned and
manned aircraft share this unfortunate quality (Huh and
Shim 2010). Evidence of this is can be seen in the military
RPAS sector with Williams (2004) reporting pilot landing
errors as the clear leader in HF issues. Similar findings
are also apparent in the air transport sector, with Boeing
(2013) reporting that 47% of fatal accidents occur in the
final approach and landing phases. A report by Huh and
Shim (2010) attributes HF occurrences in RPAS operations
to the complexities in situational awareness brought about
by the remoteness of the pilot. Without data on the pilot
in commands flight experience and time on type, it is hard
to determine whether workload or insufficient training
contributed to these events.
Limitations
There are 2 limitations of the results presented, the number
of cases, and the limited information about the cases. The
number of cases, spread over a 10-year period, prohibits an
analysis based on changes over time for different classifications.
That is, if we consider PoF (3 groups) and year of occurrence
(10 groups), breaking the data down into both (30 groups) will
result in some groups having “0” entries, which precludes the
ability to conduct a χ2 test. With a larger sample size, such that
no group had “0”, statistical analysis could be undertaken. The
same is true if we consider any combination of classifications
(PoF, ToF, OT, and OC).
The more pressing limitation is the lack of data in the case
reports. That is, other useful information such as make and
model of aircraft (even fixed wing/rotor wing type), operating/
takeoff mass and physical dimensions, or operation category
are typically not included in publically available databases for
civil RPAS occurrences. As such, the data is presented as holistic
coverage of the civil RPAS sector, collecting as many reports
as possible at this time.
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Recommendations
Based on the aforementioned limitations, the first
recommendation to be made is that reporting of occurrences,
particularly those concerning accidents and serious incidents,
should be enforced by legislation applicable to the RPAS sector.
Even though most civil aviation authorities have been revising
their regulatory framework to incorporate this need, there is
still a legislative gap to be addressed which precludes the
effective reporting of all categories of RPAS, particularly
small UAVs which regardless of their limited dimensions
might still pose a serious risk to the operation of other
aircraft and people on the ground. Concurrently, regulators
should also invest in safety promotion actions tailored to the
RPAS sector as a mean to foster operators to pro-actively
report safety occurrences involving unmanned aircraft via
the existing voluntary reporting systems irrespective of their
perceived severity.
As the current study was based on data sourced from
publicly available databases fed by voluntary reporting systems,
some of the data used herein was lacking details on the aircraft
size and maximum takeoff weight, which prevented analysing
the results taking into consideration the operation categories
typically used in similar studies for manned aircraft, such as
(Evans 2015). As such, if governments and the RPAS sector
implement and adopt reporting systems for accidents and
incidents, a more in depth analysis of the RPAS sector will be
possible. This will help to improve safety in the RPAS industry,
by developing a greater understanding and awareness of the
specific nature of accidents and incidents in different RPAS
operation categories, which is currently beyond the scope of
available data.

Conclusion
With a growth of RPAS operation forecast, and the
alleged incident involving a “drone” and a British Airways
A320 at Heathrow Airport (Stevenson 2016), it is imperative
to explore RPAS accidents and incidents. Furthermore,
common factors were identified and studies such as this
need to be continually undertaken in order to ensure the
ongoing safety of the community and the sustainability of
this thriving sector. Globally, there has been a great deal

of resources allocated by regulatory bodies to manage the
exponential growth of the civil RPAS sector. However, in
the area of accident and incident investigation and regulations
in particular, it is possible to suggest that greater focus on data
collection in the early stages of growth would have assisted
greatly in developing a more targeted approach. Numerous
studies have also been completed independently, identifying
potential hazards and risks of these systems. In order to
complement these proactive studies it is important that the
reviews of past accidents and incidents are not forgotten
as a vital source of data as they can provide an abundance
of information used to validate these studies and identify
lessons to be learnt.
This study aimed to identify common factors in RPAS
accidents and incidents in civil aviation in order to assist in
the process of mitigating these occurrences. This was done
through posing the primary question “what are the common
factors in RPAS accidents and incidents in civil aviation between
2006 and 2015?”.
The analysis uncovered that the majority of occurrences
were found to have involved SCFs with EPs dominating as
primary CF. This led to the recognition that civil operated
RPAS have distinct differences between other sectors of the
industry such as GA and air transport. The result of this
is that lessons learnt through post-accident and incident
analysis in other sectors are less able to be transferred
to the RPAS sector. Instead it was found that similarities
were seen between the military and civil RPAS sectors, and
hence RPAS is unique in the aviation industry. Currently,
the industry trend to license RPAS operators will, in effect,
focus on HFs issues. Specifically, the recommendation from
this research is that regulators need to focus primarily
on airworthiness requirements, which are still yet to be
formalised for civil RPAS (Clothier et al. 2015).
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